Are there different kinds of value?
I think that axiological monism is probably correct, which is the view that there is only one kind of (intrinsic) value. Moral, epistemic, or aesthetic values (just to take a few examples) are sometimes treated like distinct kinds or flavors of value which each have (or could have) a distinct ground. I’m inclined to think that whatever values are there is only a single thing, value, that is what makes some state of affairs good or bad.
Even an axiological monist will admit that there can be different senses in which something is good or bad, and plenty of different extrinsic values. Something can be poisonous but taste good, for example. But there’s no sense in which something is intrinsically good in one sense and intrinsically good or bad in a different sense. Monism about value excludes the possibility of something being intrinsically valuable in conflicting ways. Alternatively, we might understand the view as saying that all of the different ways something can be intrinsically valuable are commensurate with one another. The values can be compared and cross-evaluated in such a way so that states of affairs can be of equal or different value, full stop.
What is the practical effect of endorsing axiological monism? The main consequence of the view is that there is never a genuine conflict of values. For example, suppose that a prominent academic is scheduled to give a talk on a controversial subject and protestors demand that the talk be cancelled. An axiological pluralist might claim that there is a genuine conflict of values being realized here. On the one hand, we have the value of academic freedom or freedom of inquiry. This is plausibly (I think) an epistemic value—not a moral one—despite the fact that many people take freedom of speech to be a moral good. On the other hand, we have the moral values of the protestors who, let’s grant, are correct in identifying some moral objection to the content of the talk and to the harms that such a talk will directly or indirectly cause.
The axiological pluralist might say, “Look, we have these two camps and they are in genuine conflict. The values they are defending are worthy of defense but the conflict is insoluble.”
I disagree. I think that the conflict has a solution and we need not appeal to one or the other side being correct in order to solve it. Of course, if one or more of the values being defended are not actual values, then no genuine conflict exist. One or both camps are simply mistaken. But suppose this isn’t the case. Then the question is how we ought to compare purportedly distinct values. We could appeal to a kind of utilitarianism, but I don’t think that an axiological monist must be committed to utilitarianism. We could be reductionists and try to reduce all values to e.g. moral ones.
I think the best option is to acknowledge the relative significance or weight of certain values and then evaluate them accordingly. But measuring the values in this way seems to be irreducibly value-laden. I can’t evaluating the epistemic values as less significant than the moral values without thereby making an axiological (or meta-axiological?) claim. If there is only one kind of intrinsic value, then the relative significance of purportedly different values (moral, aesthetic, and so on) is the expression of that one basic value.
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